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Title | Date added | Template | Body | Legal status | Document type | Year | Document code | Original document | Paragraph text | Thematics | Topic(s) | Person(s) affected | Year |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The working poor: a human rights approach to wages | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2023 | A/78/175 | ||||||
The employment guarantee as a tool in the fight against poverty | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2023 | A/HRC/53/33 | ||||||
Banning discrimination on grounds of socioeconomic disadvantage: an essential tool in the fight against poverty | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2022 | A/77/157 | ||||||
Non-take-up of rights in the context of social protection | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2022 | A/HRC/50/38 | ||||||
Ending the vicious cycles of poverty | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2021 | A/76/177 | ||||||
Global Fund for Social Protection: international solidarity in the service of poverty eradication. | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2021 | A/HRC/47/36 | ||||||
The “just transition” in the economic recovery: Eradicating poverty within planetary boundaries | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2020 | A/75/181/REV.1 | ||||||
The parlous state of poverty eradication | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2019 | A/HRC/44/40 | ||||||
Digital welfare states and human rights | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2019 | A/74/493 | ||||||
Climate change and poverty | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2018 | A/HRC/41/39 | ||||||
Privatization and human rights | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2018 | A/73/396 | ||||||
The role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in relation to social protection | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2018 | A/HRC/38/33 | ||||||
The enjoyment of civil and political rights by persons living in poverty | Dec 12, 2023 | Document | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | 2017 | A/72/502 | ||||||
Extreme poverty and human rights on universal basic income 2017, para. 73 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Fifth, proponents of a basic income need to ensure that particular schemes to implement the concept are not narrowly linked to citizenship at the expense of all others who are part of the community. |
| 2017 | |||||
Extreme poverty and human rights on universal basic income 2017, para. 57 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Finally, a simulation for the region of Catalonia, in Spain, suggests that a basic annual income of €7,968 for those aged over 18 and of €1,594 for minors would require a 49.57 per cent flat tax rate and extra financing of €7 billion. |
| 2017 | |||||
The World Bank and human rights 2015, para. 47 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | On various occasions, senior Bank officials have warned of the dire consequences that would follow if the Bank were to become some sort of global policeman, responsible for enforcing respect for human rights by its client Governments. Because of the sanctions mentality described above, that fear is not altogether unfounded. |
| 2015 | |||||
The UN responsibility for the cholera outbreak in Haiti 2016, para. 81 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Third, there is now a much stronger commitment to taking the rule of law seriously in the context of the approach adopted within the United Nations itself, and this needs to be reflected in the legal response to cholera in Haiti. |
| 2016 | |||||
Taxation and human rightss 2014, para. 39 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Moreover, when revenue is used to finance public services, it creates conditions propitious to growth and employment in formal sectors of the economy, guaranteeing both equality of access and equality of opportunities. Public services also mitigate the impact of skewed income distribution and directly contribute to reducing inequality. |
| 2014 | |||||
Extreme poverty and human rights on universal basic income 2017, para. 14 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | The absence of conditionality is a key dimension for most basic income proponents. This means that no conditions, such as children’s attendance at school or proof of job searches, must be met before the income is paid. People are thus not compelled to accept unpleasant or unattractive jobs. The latter would be filled either by machines, or by people attracted by a higher pay level. |
| 2017 | |||||
Extreme poverty and human rights on universal basic income 2017, para. 66f | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | [One of the biggest challenges in relation to basic income is to move beyond its chameleon-like character. There are many versions of it, and each is supported by a diverse array of actors, precisely because they see different attractions in the concept. To assess the utility and acceptability of basic income from a human rights perspective, it is helpful to identify the main categories of motivation.] Fairness and social justice. |
| 2017 | |||||
Extreme poverty and human rights on universal basic income 2017, para. 18 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | In the United Kingdom, basic income proposals were prominent in the period after both world wars. In 1918, Bertrand Russell called for an income for all, sufficient to pay for “necessaries” in post-First World War Britain. And when the Beveridge plan was being debated in 1943, Juliet Rhys-Williams proposed a basic income approach instead of Beveridge’s contributory welfare state plan. |
| 2017 | |||||
Extreme poverty and human rights on universal basic income 2017, para. 32 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Negative income taxes, inspired by the work of Milton Friedman, ensure that individuals who earn below a certain threshold receive payments from the government, rather than having to pay taxes. It is similar to basic income in that every citizen is automatically and unconditionally eligible, but it differs from the full basic income in that benefits phase out as incomes rise. Amounts may also be adjusted for households. |
| 2017 | |||||
Extreme poverty and human rights on universal basic income 2017, para. 8a | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | [The present report is premised on the view that the human rights movement needs to address and respond to the fundamental changes that are taking place in economic and social structures at the national and global levels. These include, among others:] The increasingly precarious nature of employment in the age of Uber, Airbnb, outsourcing, subcontracting, zero-hours contracts and the like; |
| 2017 | |||||
The UN responsibility for the cholera outbreak in Haiti 2016, para. 40 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | The global media has been systematically critical of the United Nations. For example, the Economist has accused the United Nations of dodging its responsibility, the New York Times argues that it has "failed to face up to its role in [Haiti's] continuing tragedy", Business Insider has referred to the cholera outbreak as "the UN's Watergate", the Washington Post has commented that "by refusing to acknowledge responsibility, the United Nations jeopardizes its standing and moral authority". |
| 2016 | |||||
The UN responsibility for the cholera outbreak in Haiti 2016, para. 38 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Although the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, called publicly in 2013 for the Haitian victims to be compensated, the abdication approach has otherwise prevailed in the ranks of United Nations officials, under the watchful eye of the Office of Legal Affairs. |
| 2016 | |||||
The UN responsibility for the cholera outbreak in Haiti 2016, para. 21 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Immediately after the publication of the panel's report in May 2011, a United Nations spokesperson was dismissive of the report on the grounds that it did "not present any conclusive scientific evidence linking the outbreak to the MINUSTAH peacekeepers or the Mirebalais camp". Senior officials have continued to rely on this defence. However, the more detailed and official response provided in a letter dated 25 November 2014 from Assistant Secretary-General Pedro Medrano Rojas, Senior Coordinator for the Cholera Response in Haiti, addressed to the special procedures mandate holders took a different tack. Although the letter is long and detailed, it curiously makes no mention of the panel's principal finding, which was, as noted above, that that "the source of the Haiti cholera outbreak was due to contamination of the Meye Tributary of the Artibonite River with a pathogenic strain of current South Asian type Vibrio cholerae as a result of human activity". In other words, MINUSTAH was indeed the source. Instead, after citing the panel's reference to poor water and sanitation conditions and inadequate medical facilities, Mr. Medrano suggested that the main outcome of the inquiry was the statement that the outbreak "was not the fault of, or due to deliberate action by, a group or individual". Similarly, regularly updated fact sheets describing the United Nations response continue to make no mention of the panel's principal conclusion in relation to MINUSTAH. It has been airbrushed out of the picture. |
| 2016 | |||||
The World Bank and human rights 2015, para. 60 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | Fifth, the Bank needs at least a convincing due diligence policy to enable it to adjust or reject projects that would otherwise lead to, or support, human rights violations. Its safeguard policies have long been referred to as "do-no-harm" policies, but their very limited coverage in terms of the full gamut of the human rights obligations of States has meant that many serious violations are alleged to have occurred in the context of projects funded by the Bank. The Special Rapporteur is in no position to judge the accuracy of any particular allegations of rights violations and nor is it necessary to do so in the present report. Suffice it to note that the Bank's own internal reports have made clear that existing safeguard arrangements have often proved to be inadequate. Reports by the Inspection Panel have highlighted significant problems in specific projects and a report by the Internal Audit Department on resettlement programmes has revealed serious systemic deficiencies. To its credit, the Bank responded to the latter by announcing extensive reforms. Nonetheless, those evaluation reports provide powerful evidence of the need for a more sustained and better integrated approach, reflecting the full range of international human rights standards rather than the static list of specific concerns that are currently singled out for monitoring. Integrating human rights into operational policies is necessary to comply with the Bank's aim of doing no harm. |
| 2015 | |||||
Taxation and human rightss 2014, para. 63 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | In many countries, business enterprises are taxed at a very low rate, even if they make large profits, owing in large part to the infrastructure, healthy educated workforce and other resources that public funds enable. In addition, many large transnational corporations are able to effectively avoid tax in many jurisdictions, including in countries where they make large profits. |
| 2014 | |||||
Unpaid care work and women's human rights 2013, para. 92 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | States must act to ensure more equal distribution of care work. This requires redistribution in three forms: redistribution between women and men; redistribution from households to the State; and redistribution of time and resources towards poorer families and households. |
| 2013 | |||||
Unpaid care work and women's human rights 2013, para. 100 | Aug 19, 2019 | Paragraph | Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights | Non-negotiated soft law | Special Procedures' report | An important part of the State's investment in care services is the recruitment of adequate numbers of paid care professionals such as nurses, and providing them with decent pay and working conditions. Overall, States should shift from a strategy of reliance on market and voluntary provision of care that is informal and exploitative to one that allows professional, decently paid and compassionate forms of care. |
| 2013 |