CAT/C/GC/4 to the person who is the victim of the violation of the Convention.62 In the context of article 3 of the Convention, the Committee considers that exhaustion of domestic remedies means that the complainant has applied for remedies that are directly related to the risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which the person would be deported, not for remedies that might allow the complainant to remain in the sending State party for other reasons.63 35. The Committee further considers that an effective remedy in the implementation of the principle of “non-refoulement” should be a recourse able to preclude, in practice, the deportation of the complainant where there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would personally be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported to another country. The recourse should be a legally-based right and not an ex gratia concession given by the authorities concerned, 64 and should be accessible in practice without obstacles of any nature. B. Interim measures of protection 36. When the Committee, or members designated by it, requests the State party concerned, for its urgent consideration, to take such interim measures, once the decision on deportation by the domestic authorities has become enforceable according to the information available, that the Committee considers necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of an alleged violation of article 3 of the Convention, in accordance with rule 114 of the Committee’s rules of procedure, the State party should comply with the Committee’s request in good faith. 37. Non-compliance by the State party with the Committee’s request would constitute serious damage and an obstacle to the effectiveness of the Committee’s deliberations and would cast serious doubt on the willingness of the State party to implement article 22 of the Convention in good faith. 65 The Committee has therefore determined that the noncompliance with its request for interim measures constitutes a breach of article 22. 66 C. Merits 38. With respect to the application of article 3 of the Convention to the merits of a communication submitted under article 22, the burden of proof is upon the author of the communication, who must present an arguable case, 67 that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real. However, when complainants are in a situation where they cannot elaborate on their case, such as when they have demonstrated that they have no possibility of obtaining documentation relating to their allegation of torture or have been deprived of their liberty, the burden of proof is reversed 68 and the State party concerned must investigate the allegations and verify the information on which the communication is based. 39. It is the responsibility of the State party, at the national level, to assess, through administrative and/or judicial procedures, whether there are substantial grounds for 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 See, for example, A.E. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/14/D/24/1995), para. 4; Evloev v. Kazakhstan (CAT/C/51/D/441/2010), para. 8.6; and W.G.D. v. Canada (CAT/C/53/D/520/2012), para. 7.4. See, for example, W.G.D. v. Canada, para. 7.4. See, for example, W.G.D. v. Canada, para. 7.4; and J.K. v. Canada (CAT/C/56/D/562/2013), para. 9.2. See Kalinichenko v. Morocco (CAT/C/47/D/428/2010), paras. 13.1, 13.2 and 16; Tursunov v. Kazakhstan, para. 10; X. v. the Russian Federation (CAT/C/54/D/542/2013), paras. 9.2 and 12; and D.I.S. v. Hungary (CAT/C/56/D/671/2015), paras. 9.1–9.3. See, for example, S.T. v. Australia (CAT/C/61/D/614/2014), paras. 9 and 10; and X. v. the Russian Federation, para. 12. See Sivagnanaratnam v. Denmark (CAT/C/51/D/429/2010), paras. 10.5 and 10.6; Mr. A.R. v. Netherlands (CAT/C/31/D/203/2002), para. 7.3; Arthur Kasombola Kalonzo v. Canada (CAT/C/48/D/343/2008), para. 9.3; X. v. Denmark (CAT/C/53/D/458/2011), para. 9.3; W.G.D. v. Canada, para. 8.4; and T.Z. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/62/D/688/2015), para. 8.4. For comparison, see S.P.A. v. Canada, para. 7.5; and J.K. v. Canada, para. 10.4. 11