CAT/C/GC/4 believing that the complainant faces a foreseeable, present, personal and real risk of being subjected to torture in the State to which the complainant would be deported. 40. In its procedure of assessment, the State party should provide the person concerned with fundamental guarantees and safeguards, especially if the person has been deprived of the person’s liberty or is in a particularly vulnerable situation, such as the situation of an asylum seeker, an unaccompanied minor, a woman who has been subjected to violence or a person with disabilities (measures of protection).69 41. Guarantees and safeguards should include linguistic, legal, medical, social and, when necessary, financial assistance, as well as the right to recourse against a decision of deportation within a reasonable time frame, for a person in a precarious and stressful situation and with a suspensive effect on the enforcement of the deportation order. In particular, an examination by a qualified medical doctor, including as requested by the complainant to prove the torture that the complainant has suffered, should always be ensured, regardless of the authorities’ assessment of the credibility of the allegation, 70 so that the authorities deciding on a given case of deportation are able to complete the assessment of the risk of torture on the basis of the result of the medical and psychological examinations, without any reasonable doubt.71 42. Victims of torture and other vulnerable persons frequently suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder, which can result in a broad range of symptoms, including involuntary avoidance and dissociation. These symptoms may affect the ability of the person to disclose all relevant details or to relay a consistent story throughout the proceedings. In order to ensure that victims of torture or other vulnerable persons are afforded an effective remedy, States parties should refrain from following a standardized credibility assessment process to determine the validity of a non-refoulement claim. With regard to potential factual contradictions and inconsistencies in the author’s allegations, States parties should appreciate that complete accuracy can seldom be expected from victims of torture.72 43. To determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported, the Committee considers as crucial the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights, referred to in article 3 (2) of the Convention. Such violations include, but are not limited to: (a) widespread use of torture 73 and impunity of its perpetrators; 74 (b) harassment and violence against minority groups; 75 (c) situations conducive to genocide; 76 (d) widespread gender-based violence; 77 (e) widespread use of sentencing and imprisonment of persons exercising fundamental freedoms; 78 and (f) situations of international and non-international armed conflicts.79 44. The Committee’s assessment will be based primarily on the information provided by or on behalf of the complainant and by the State party concerned. The Committee will also consult United Nations sources of information, as well as any other sources that it considers 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 12 See, for example, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the Netherlands (CAT/C/NET/CO/4), para. 7; and concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Cyprus (CAT/C/CYP/CO/4), paras. 13 and 14. See, for example, M.B. and others v. Denmark, para. 9.8. See also footnotes 23–30 above. See, for example, Alan v. Switzerland (CAT/C/16/D/21/1995), para. 11.3; Kisoki v. Sweden (CAT/C/16/D/41/1996), para. 9.3; Haydin v. Sweden (CAT/C/21/D/101/1997), paras. 6.6 and 6.7; and C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden (CAT/C/37/D/279/2005), para. 7.6; E.K.W. v. Finland, para. 9.6; and M.B. and others v. Denmark, para. 9.6. See, for example, X. v. Kazakhstan (CAT/C/55/D/554/2013), para. 12.7. See, for example, P.S.B. and T.K. v. Canada (CAT/C/55/D/505/2012), para. 8.3. See, for example, Subakaran R. Thirugnanasampanthar v. Australia, para. 8.7. See, for example, concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1 and CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1/Corr.1), paras. 11 and 12. See, for example, J.K. v. Canada, paras. 10.5 and 10.6. See, for example, Abed Azizi v. Switzerland (CAT/C/53/D/492/2012), paras. 8.5–8.8. See, for example, concluding observations on the initial report of Chad (CAT/C/TCD/CO/1), para. 22.