106. Some delegations noted that the classical distinction into civil and political rights as justiciable, and economic, social and cultural rights as non-justiciable could, in the light of practice, case law and academic writings, no longer be maintained. Elements from both could be found in either category. Empowering the Committee to determine justiciability on a case-by-case basis would also enable the further development of case law on the question of justiciability of human rights provisions. It might also stimulate States parties to create effective national remedies and recourse mechanisms for women. 107. While recognizing the potential for difficulties in determining justiciability of some provisions under an individual communications procedure, a number of delegations cautioned against a categorization of treaty provisions into justiciable and non-justiciable. They noted that that would seriously impair the integrity and unity of the Convention and establish a hierarchy of more and less important rights. The right to equality and non-discrimination had in itself been accepted as justiciable by existing human rights mechanisms, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Regional mechanisms, such as the European Convention, the Inter-American Convention and the African Charter, contained different types of rights, offered individual communications and/or inquiry procedures, but did not distinguish between justiciable and non-justiciable rights. 108. Other delegations expressed their doubts about the inclusion of all the provisions of the Convention under an individual communications procedure. While they agreed that certain rights were quite specific and would thus lend themselves to such complaints, others were of a general nature where the basis for individual recourse would be difficult to determine given the State party’s margin of appreciation with regard to measures to be taken. Articles 3, 5 and aspects of 10 were mentioned as examples where difficulties in implementing an individual right to petition would potentially arise. The comparison with the national level, where civil and political rights were justiciable, was made. 109. In that regard, some delegations were of the view that any decision on justiciability should not be left to the Committee on a case-by-case basis, but should be settled among member States. Differences between various legal systems in determining exhaustion of domestic remedies and of standing would also need to be addressed. The question of determining the exhaustion of domestic remedies with regard to programmatic provisions of the Convention was raised, including the assessment of exhaustion of non-judicial remedies. The impact on third parties, that is, on private individuals, of provisions of the Convention would also need to be addressed. 110. Rather than categorizing the provisions as justiciable and non-justiciable, it was suggested that the purpose of the optional protocol needed to be further reviewed and its applicability determined. An admissibility criterion could be the reliable evidence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of the rights guaranteed in the Convention, along the lines of the 1503 procedure. It was also suggested that a solution could be sought through the determination of the Committee’s mandate, power, and the type of recommendations it could pronounce at the end of a communication procedure. In that regard, it was proposed that those would be of a recommendatory, non-binding nature, allowing the State party ultimately to reach a conclusion different from the Committee’s. While under the more specific provisions, the Committee’s views could be very specific, in others, the process would be more in the form of a dialogue between the Committee and the State party. -122-