90. Some delegations raised the question of possible overlapping between an inquiry procedure and existing mechanisms, especially with the communications procedure of the Commission and the 1503 procedure. Others noted the differences in, and complementarity of, these procedures in regard to the proposed inquiry procedure. They expressed concern about the length of the process under the 1503 procedure, particularly for violations which needed immediate action. The intergovernmental character of the Commission’s communications procedure and of the 1503 procedure on the one hand, and of the expert character of the proposed inquiry procedure on the other, were noted. Other delegations emphasized the need to mainstream women’s human rights, because the human rights of women were not the main focus of other human rights bodies. Some noted that Charter-based procedures and other treaty-based procedures were based on different instruments, not on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Element 17 91. Regarding the formulation of element 17, several delegations noted that the threshold for admissibility would need to be both serious and systematic violations, that is, there would be a high threshold to initiate an inquiry. Some noted that an inquiry procedure would enable the Committee to deal with patterns of widespread violations of women’s human rights and allow it to address a broader range of issues, including structural causes of violations, than would be the case under the individual procedure. Reliable information would be required to start the procedure. A few delegations expressed concern at the optional nature of many aspects of the proposed inquiry procedure, underlining the need for more active investigation into serious and systematic violations. 92. Some delegations stated that some provisions of the Convention might lend themselves more to an inquiry procedure than to an individual complaints procedure. A more comprehensive discussion of the merits of the inquiry procedure would thus depend on the development of the communications procedure. Some delegations noted that the "serious and systematic" criteria would need to apply both to alleged violations and to alleged failures to comply. Other delegations found the "failure" category to be redundant. The scope of element 17 would be considered too broad if it were to be applied to all of the rights covered by the Convention. Element 18 93. The question was raised as to what mechanisms would be available in case of non-cooperation of a State party. Element 19 94. The need for including a time-limit was raised. Element 20 95. Some delegations noted that only the State party concerned would participate in the inquiry, not "States parties". As to the intention of confidentiality in this element, it was suggested that, contrary to the individual communications procedure, those who submitted information leading to an inquiry procedure would not be involved in its conduct, but that this would be limited to the Committee and the State party. -119-