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The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 60
- Paragraph text
- States should not restrict encryption and anonymity, which facilitate and often enable the rights to freedom of opinion and expression. Blanket prohibitions fail to be necessary and proportionate. States should avoid all measures that weaken the security that individuals may enjoy online, such as backdoors, weak encryption standards and key escrows. In addition, States should refrain from making the identification of users a condition for access to digital communications and online services and requiring SIM card registration for mobile users. Corporate actors should likewise consider their own policies that restrict encryption and anonymity (including through the use of pseudonyms). Court-ordered decryption, subject to domestic and international law, may only be permissible when it results from transparent and publicly accessible laws applied solely on a targeted, case-by-case basis to individuals (i.e., not to a mass of people) and subject to judicial warrant and the protection of due process rights of individuals.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2015
Paragraph
The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 51
- Paragraph text
- Likewise, Governments often require SIM card registration; for instance, nearly 50 countries in Africa require or are in the process of requiring the registration of personally identifiable data when activating a SIM card. Colombia has had a mandatory mobile registration policy since 2011, and Peru has associated all SIM cards with a national identification number since 2010. Other countries are considering such policies. Such policies directly undermine anonymity, particularly for those who access the Internet only through mobile technology. Compulsory SIM card registration may provide Governments with the capacity to monitor individuals and journalists well beyond any legitimate government interest.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2015
Paragraph
The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 50
- Paragraph text
- Certain States have passed laws that require real-name registration for online activity, a kind of ban on anonymity. In the Russian Federation, bloggers with 3,000 or more daily readers must register with the media regulator and identify themselves publicly, and cybercafe users reportedly must provide identification to connect to public wireless facilities. China reportedly announced regulations requiring Internet users to register real names for certain websites and avoid spreading content that challenges national interests. South Africa also requires real name registration for online and mobile telephone users.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2015
Paragraph
The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 37
- Paragraph text
- It also bears noting that the United Nations itself has not provided strong communication security tools to its staff or to those who would visit United Nations websites, making it difficult for those under threat to securely reach the United Nations, human rights mechanisms online.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2015
Paragraph
The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 36
- Paragraph text
- The trend lines regarding security and privacy online are deeply worrying. States often fail to provide public justification to support restrictions. Encrypted and anonymous communications may frustrate law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials, and they complicate surveillance, but State authorities have not generally identified situations - even in general terms, given the potential need for confidentiality - where a restriction has been necessary to achieve a legitimate goal. States downplay the value of traditional non-digital tools in law enforcement and counter-terrorism efforts, including transnational cooperation. As a consequence, the public lacks an opportunity to measure whether restrictions on their online security would be justified by any real gains in national security and crime prevention. Efforts to restrict encryption and anonymity also tend to be quick reactions to terrorism, even when the attackers themselves are not alleged to have used encryption or anonymity to plan or carry out an attack. Moreover, even where the restriction is arguably in pursuit of a legitimate interest, many laws and policies regularly do not meet the standards of necessity and proportionality and have broad, deleterious effects on the ability of all individuals to exercise freely their rights to privacy and freedom of opinion and expression.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2015
Paragraph
The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 17
- Paragraph text
- Encryption and anonymity are especially useful for the development and sharing of opinions, which often occur through online correspondence such as e-mail, text messaging, and other online interactions. Encryption provides security so that individuals are able "to verify that their communications are received only by their intended recipients, without interference or alteration, and that the communications they receive are equally free from intrusion" (see A/HRC/23/40 and Corr.1, para. 23). Given the power of metadata analysis to specify "an individual's behaviour, social relationships, private preferences and identity" (see A/HRC/27/37, para. 19), anonymity may play a critical role in securing correspondence. Besides correspondence, international and regional mechanisms have interpreted privacy to involve a range of other circumstances as well.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2015
Paragraph
The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 9
- Paragraph text
- Notably, encryption protects the content of communications but not identifying factors such as the Internet Protocol (IP) address, known as metadata. Third parties may gather significant information concerning an individual's identity through metadata analysis if the user does not employ anonymity tools. Anonymity is the condition of avoiding identification. A common human desire to protect one's identity from the crowd, anonymity may liberate a user to explore and impart ideas and opinions more than she would using her actual identity. Individuals online may adopt pseudonyms (or, for instance, fake e-mail or social media accounts) to hide their identities, image, voice, location and so forth, but the privacy afforded through such pseudonyms is superficial and easily disturbed by Governments or others with the necessary expertise; in the absence of combinations of encryption and anonymizing tools, the digital traces that users leave behind render their identities easily discoverable. Users seeking to ensure full anonymity or mask their identity (such as hiding the original IP address) against State or criminal intrusion may use tools such as virtual private networks (VPNs), proxy services, anonymizing networks and software, and peer-to-peer networks. One well-known anonymity tool, the Tor network, deploys more than 6,000 decentralized computer servers around the world to receive and relay data multiple times so as to hide identifying information about the end points, creating strong anonymity for its users.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Social & Cultural Rights
- Year
- 2015
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 49
- Paragraph text
- The Guiding Principles seek to address the gaps in corporate accountability left because of a lack of national legislation or implementation. However, zealous enforcement of domestic law also poses human rights challenges in the digital access industry. For example, States may hold providers liable for, or otherwise pressure them to restrict, Internet content posted by users on their networks, under laws as varied as hate speech, defamation, cybercrime and lese-majesty. Yet such intermediary liability creates a strong incentive to censor: providers may find it safest not to challenge such regulation but to over-regulate content such that legitimate and lawful expression also ends up restricted. The pressure to assist in State censorship and surveillance also escalates when authorities harass, threaten or arrest employees, or attempt to tamper with the company’s networks or equipment.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 42
- Paragraph text
- Some evidence suggests that vendors may provide support for government censorship and surveillance. In a case pending before United States courts, Cisco has been accused of designing, implementing and helping to maintain a Chinese surveillance and internal security network known as the Golden Shield. (Cisco denies those allegations.) In Ethiopia, human rights groups found that ZTE Corporation had designed and installed a customer management database for Ethio Telecom that enabled intrusive surveillance.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 37
- Paragraph text
- The censorship resilience of content delivery networks has also made them targets of disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression. In Egypt, the blocking of The New Arab website in August 2016 also disrupted access to content on other sites that, although unaffiliated, shared the same content delivery network, which led researchers to believe authorities had targeted that particular network. In China, a national filter has reportedly blocked EdgeCast content delivery network, which handles content for a number of large websites in the country.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 35
- Paragraph text
- IXPs handle an enormous volume of Internet traffic that may be filtered or intercepted at government request. The growing number of censorship and surveillance incidents involving IXPs indicates that they are major access choke points, even if their precise role is unclear. For example, in 2013, the manner in which access to YouTube was blocked in Pakistan indicated that the platform was filtered by IXPs, rather than ISPs, through a method known as “packet injection”. According to a leaked internal memo of a multinational ISP operating in Ecuador, users were unable to access Google and YouTube in March 2014 because the private Association of Internet Providers of Ecuador — which runs two of the major IXPs in the country — was “blocking access to certain Internet websites by request of the national Government”. The revelations of mass surveillance conducted by the United States National Security Agency have raised concern among technologists that the agency is intercepting a significant proportion of domestic and foreign Internet traffic by targeting United States IXPs. In September 2016, the world’s largest Internet exchange point, which is based in Germany, challenged legal orders issued by the country’s intelligence agency to monitor international communications transiting through its hub.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 16
- Paragraph text
- Shutdowns also affect areas beyond those of specific concern. In the lead up to the 2015 National Day Parade in Pakistan, mobile communications networks were allegedly cut off at the parade site as well as in surrounding areas that were not expected to experience any potential security threat. During the Pope’s visit to the Philippines in 2015, the shutdown of mobile networks for safety reasons affected areas well beyond the travel route. When specific services or platforms are disrupted, governments typically target those that are the most efficient, secure or widely used.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Humanitarian
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 14
- Paragraph text
- Network shutdowns invariably fail to meet the standard of necessity. Necessity requires a showing that shutdowns would achieve their stated purpose, which in fact they often jeopardize. Some governments argue that it is important to ban the spread of news about terrorist attacks, even accurate reporting, in order to prevent panic and copycat actions. Yet it has been found that maintaining network connectivity may mitigate public safety concerns and help restore public order. During public disturbances in London in 2011, for example, authorities used social media networks to identify perpetrators, disseminate accurate information and conduct clean-up operations. In Kashmir, police have reported on the positive role of mobile phones in locating people trapped during terrorist attacks.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Humanitarian
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 13
- Paragraph text
- Observers have also noted the growing use of shutdowns to prevent cheating by students during national exams. Uzbekistan may have been the first to invoke this justification during university entrance exams in 2014. In 2016, authorities allegedly ordered shutdowns during exams in India, Algeria, Ethiopia and Iraq.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 9
- Paragraph text
- Shutdowns ordered covertly or without an obvious legal basis violate the requirement of article 19 (3) of the Covenant that restrictions be “provided by law”. In Chad, the failure of authorities to provide a meaningful public explanation for a series of Internet and social media shutdowns between February and October 2016 created the presumption that they were unlawful. In Gabon, total network outages were allegedly recorded every evening for almost two weeks during the 2016 election period, contrary to government assurances that such services would not be disrupted.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2017
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression in electoral contexts 2014, para. 83c
- Paragraph text
- [Accountability mechanisms are a crucial means of ensuring that regulatory frameworks are enforced and abuses of power are rectified. Impunity is a root cause of the lack of safety faced by journalists. In the context of promoting free expression during electoral processes, States should:] Call on journalists and the media to seek the highest standards of professionalism and ethics through the promotion of self-regulation.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2014
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression in electoral contexts 2014, para. 83a
- Paragraph text
- [Accountability mechanisms are a crucial means of ensuring that regulatory frameworks are enforced and abuses of power are rectified. Impunity is a root cause of the lack of safety faced by journalists. In the context of promoting free expression during electoral processes, States should:] Ensure that electoral authorities or independent oversight bodies are given sufficient financial and human resources, and enforcement powers to carry out their duties effectively, making all political entities accountable for irregularities, including all forms of abuse of political and economic powers;
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2014
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression in electoral contexts 2014, para. 76
- Paragraph text
- During electoral processes, States must ensure that the right to freedom of expression is guaranteed to political candidates and their supporters, opposition groups, political lobbies and the whole spectrum of media actors, from news media to bloggers, commentators and analysts. Political communications must be unhindered by restrictions that hamper the fluid exchange of opinions, whether such restrictions come in the form of explicit prohibitions of certain political positions, or limitations that indirectly "chill" the expression of the opinions of political groups, such as controls of media content or on public demonstrations. At the same time, the absence of a regulatory framework to control political financing and spending, or to ensure accountability and redress for rights violations, also undermines the ability of voters, political groups and the media to exercise the right to freedom of expression during electoral processes.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2014
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression in electoral contexts 2014, para. 74
- Paragraph text
- Exit polling, where voters are surveyed upon exiting a polling booth, are also considered risky when their results are reported while votes are being counted. Thus, many countries prevent the publication of exit polls until the conclusion of voting.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Equality & Inclusion
- Year
- 2014
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression in electoral contexts 2014, para. 38
- Paragraph text
- Restrictions on political expression take a variety of forms - from defamation and slander laws, to blanket bans on critical expression relating to incumbent politicians, to the prohibition of whole media sources, outlets and websites - and impact not only the individuals or groups which might run afoul of them, but the media outlets or intermediaries that publish restricted, or what is considered to be illegal, political expression.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Year
- 2014
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression exercised through the Internet 2011, para. 70
- Paragraph text
- The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned by increasingly sophisticated blocking or filtering mechanisms used by States for censorship. The lack of transparency surrounding these measures also makes it difficult to ascertain whether blocking or filtering is really necessary for the purported aims put forward by States. As such, the Special Rapporteur calls upon States that currently block websites to provide lists of blocked websites and full details regarding the necessity and justification for blocking each individual website. An explanation should also be provided on the affected websites as to why they have been blocked. Any determination on what content should be blocked must be undertaken by a competent judicial authority or a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2011
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression exercised through the Internet 2011, para. 65
- Paragraph text
- In some economically developed States, Internet access has been recognized as a right. For example, the parliament of Estonia passed legislation in 2000 declaring Internet access a basic human right. The constitutional council of France effectively declared Internet access a fundamental right in 2009, and the constitutional court of Costa Rica reached a similar decision in 2010. Going a step further, Finland passed a decree in 2009 stating that every Internet connection needs to have a speed of at least one Megabit per second (broadband level). The Special Rapporteur also takes note that according to a survey by the British Broadcasting Corporation in March 2010, 79% of those interviewed in 26 countries believe that Internet access is a fundamental human right.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2011
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression exercised through the Internet 2011, para. 51
- Paragraph text
- Cyber-attacks, or attempts to undermine or compromise the function of a computer-based system, include measures such as hacking into accounts or computer networks, and often take the form of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. During such attacks, a group of computers is used to inundate a web server where the targeted website is hosted with requests, and as a result, the targeted website crashes and becomes inaccessible for a certain period of time. As with timed blocking, such attacks are sometimes undertaken during key political moments. The Special Rapporteur also notes that websites of human rights organizations and dissidents are frequently and increasingly becoming targets of DDoS attacks, some of which are included in the first addendum to this report.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Humanitarian
- Violence
- Year
- 2011
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression exercised through the Internet 2011, para. 33
- Paragraph text
- The types of action taken by States to limit the dissemination of content online not only include measures to prevent information from reaching the end-user, but also direct targeting of those who seek, receive and impart politically sensitive information via the Internet. Physically silencing criticism or dissent through arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearance, harassment and intimidation is an old phenomenon, and also applies to Internet users. This issue has been explored in the Special Rapporteur's report to the General Assembly under the section on "protection of citizen journalists" (A/65/284). Such actions are often aimed not only to silence legitimate expression, but also to intimidate a population to push its members towards self-censorship.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2011
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression exercised through the Internet 2011, para. 30
- Paragraph text
- The Special Rapporteur is also concerned by the emerging trend of timed (or "just-in-time") blocking to prevent users from accessing or disseminating information at key political moments, such as elections, times of social unrest, or anniversaries of politically or historically significant events. During such times, websites of opposition parties, independent media, and social networking platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are blocked, as witnessed in the context of recent protests across the Middle East and North African region. In Egypt, users were disconnected entirely from Internet access.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2011
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression exercised through the Internet 2011, para. 29
- Paragraph text
- Blocking refers to measures taken to prevent certain content from reaching an end-user. This includes preventing users from accessing specific websites, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, domain name extensions, the taking down of websites from the web server where they are hosted, or using filtering technologies to exclude pages containing keywords or other specific content from appearing. For example, several countries continue to block access to YouTube, a video-sharing website on which users can upload, share and view videos. China, which has in place one of the most sophisticated and extensive systems for controlling information on the Internet, has adopted extensive filtering systems that block access to websites containing key terms such as "democracy" and "human rights". The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned that mechanisms used to regulate and censor information on the Internet are increasingly sophisticated, with multi-layered controls that are often hidden from the public.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2011
Paragraph
The right to access information 2013, para. 107
- Paragraph text
- Government officials who release confidential information concerning violations of the law, wrongdoing by public bodies, grave cases of corruption, a serious threat to health, safety or the environment, or a violation of human rights or humanitarian law (i.e. whistle-blowers) should, if they act in good faith, be protected against legal, administrative or employment-related sanctions. Other individuals, including journalists, other media personnel and civil society representatives, who receive, possess or disseminate classified information because they believe that it is in the public interest, should not be subject to liability unless they place persons in an imminent situation of serious harm.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Environment
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Health
- Humanitarian
- Year
- 2013
Paragraph
The right to access information 2013, para. 69
- Paragraph text
- Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur has highlighted the fact that, under no circumstances, may journalists, members of the media or members of civil society who have access to and distribute classified information on alleged violation of human rights be subjected to subsequent punishment. Equally, confidential sources and materials relating to the disclosure of classified information must be protected by law. In this context, journalistic self-regulatory mechanisms and codes can significantly contribute to drawing attention to eventual risks in the communication of complex and sensitive issues.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2013
Paragraph
The right to access information 2013, para. 47
- Paragraph text
- Lastly, the circulation of false information has been considered in certain cases to be a violation in itself, especially where individuals or groups of individuals have been submitted to odium, stigmatization, public scorn, persecution or discrimination by means of public declarations by public officials.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Year
- 2013
Paragraph
The right to access information 2013, para. 38
- Paragraph text
- By its resolution 65/196, the General Assembly proclaimed 24 March as the International Day for the Right to the Truth concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims, in recognition of the work and values of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero of El Salvador, who was killed in 1980. In his message on the day in 2013, the Secretary-General emphasized the individual and collective dimension of the right to truth, noting that each victim had the right to know the truth about violations against them, but that the truth also had to be told more widely as a safeguard to prevent violations from happening again.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Year
- 2013
Paragraph