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The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 61
- Paragraph text
- States, international organizations, corporations and civil society groups should promote online security. Given the relevance of new communication technologies in the promotion of human rights and development, all those involved should systematically promote access to encryption and anonymity without discrimination. The Special Rapporteur urgently calls upon entities of the United Nations system, especially those involved in human rights and humanitarian protection, to support the use of communication security tools in order to ensure that those who interact with them may do so securely. United Nations entities must revise their communication practices and tools and invest resources in enhancing security and confidentiality for the multiple stakeholders interacting with the Organization through digital communications. Particular attention must be paid by human rights protection mechanisms when requesting and managing information received from civil society and witnesses and victims of human rights violations.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Equality & Inclusion
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2015
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The implications of States’ surveillance of communications on the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression 2013, para. 17
- Paragraph text
- In many countries, existing legislation and practices have not been reviewed and updated to address the threats and challenges of communications surveillance in the digital age. Traditional notions of access to written correspondence, for example, have been imported into laws permitting access to personal computers and other information and communications technologies, without consideration of the expanded uses of such devices and the implications for individuals' rights. At the same time, the absence of laws to regulate global communications surveillance and sharing arrangements has resulted in ad hoc practices that are beyond the supervision of any independent authority. Today, in many States, access to communications data can be conducted by a wide range of public bodies for a wide range of purposes, often without judicial authorization and independent oversight. In addition, States have sought to adopt surveillance arrangements that purport to have extra-territorial effect.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
Access to information in international organizations 2017, para. 40
- Paragraph text
- The UNDP information disclosure policy provides a good example of how to approach exceptions. Its policy, which notes that the organization operates in contexts of “crisis, conflict or humanitarian disasters” that pose challenges to UNDP operations and Member State interests, identifies several categories of information deemed confidential and “not available to the public”. Not all of the categories of exceptions are entirely appropriate, such as “[c]ommercial information where disclosure would harm either the financial interests of UNDP or those of third parties involved” or “[i]nformation which, if disclosed, in UNDP’s view would seriously undermine the policy dialogue with Member States or implementing partners”. (These exceptions are found in the policies of other intergovernmental organizations as well.) Both categories seem overbroad and subject to undue discretion of the organization. Nonetheless, recognizing this potential for overbreadth and potentially illegitimate non-disclosure in paragraph 12 of its information disclosure policy, UNDP provides that it could disclose even “confidential” information “if it determines that the overall benefits and public interest of such disclosure outweighs the likely harm to the interest(s) protected by the exception(s)”. Such authority rests not only in UNDP itself but in the independent panel created to oversee such decisions.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2017
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The use of encryption and anonymity to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age 2015, para. 58
- Paragraph text
- Discussions of encryption and anonymity have all too often focused only on their potential use for criminal purposes in times of terrorism. But emergency situations do not relieve States of the obligation to ensure respect for international human rights law. Legislative proposals for the revision or adoption of restrictions on individual security online should be subject to public debate and adopted according to regular, public, informed and transparent legislative process. States must promote effective participation of a wide variety of civil society actors and minority groups in such debate and processes and avoid adopting such legislation under accelerated legislative procedures. General debate should highlight the protection that encryption and anonymity provide, especially to the groups most at risk of unlawful interferences. Any such debate must also take into account that restrictions are subject to strict tests: if they interfere with the right to hold opinions, restrictions must not be adopted. Restrictions on privacy that limit freedom of expression - for purposes of the present report, restrictions on encryption and anonymity - must be provided by law and be necessary and proportionate to achieve one of a small number of legitimate objectives.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2015
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The implications of States’ surveillance of communications on the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression 2013, para. 99
- Paragraph text
- Human rights mechanisms should further assess the obligations of private actors developing and supplying surveillance technologies.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The implications of States’ surveillance of communications on the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression 2013, para. 62
- Paragraph text
- A number of the surveillance capabilities listed above fall outside of existing legal frameworks, but have nevertheless been widely adopted by States. Offensive intrusion software such as Trojans, or mass interception capabilities, constitute such serious challenges to traditional notions of surveillance that they cannot be reconciled with existing laws on surveillance and access to private information. These are not just new methods for conducting surveillance; they are new forms of surveillance. From a human rights perspective, the use of such technologies is extremely disturbing. Trojans, for example, not only enable a State to access devices, but also enable them to alter - inadvertently or purposefully - the information contained therein. This threatens not only the right to privacy and procedural fairness rights with respect to the use of such evidence in legal proceedings. Mass interception technology eradicates any considerations of proportionality, enabling indiscriminate surveillance. It enables the State to copy and monitor every single act of communication in a particular country or area, without gaining authorization for each individual case of interception.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 40
- Paragraph text
- Given their business model, vendors are required to navigate the human rights challenges that their customers face or create. In the area of surveillance, vendors are often bound by “lawful interception” measures, which require the configuration of networks to enable government access to user data. Additionally, vendors may be contracted to establish “administration and mediation systems” that facilitate the sharing of intercepted data between the network operator and the government authority as well as the government systems that process the intercepted data. In arrangements where vendors also manage the networks that they have built, they may also be responsible for handling government requests for user data on the operator’s behalf.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2017
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 10
- Paragraph text
- Shutdowns ordered pursuant to vaguely formulated laws and regulations also fail to satisfy the legality requirement. In Tajikistan, the amended Law on the State of Emergency authorizes the Government to block mobile services and Internet access without a court order following the declaration of a state of emergency. The law fails to define when and for what purposes a state of emergency may be declared. Such ambiguity enables authorities’ unfettered discretion to implement shutdowns. In some countries, authorities rely on antiquated laws to justify shutdowns. Laws and regulations adopted and implemented in secret also violate the legality requirement. In the United States of America, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications has largely redacted public release of standard operating procedure 303, an executive regulation that establishes “detailed procedures” on the “disruption of cellular service.” While these procedures have not been publicly invoked, the potential for authorities to evade legal scrutiny and public accountability runs contrary to article 19 of the Covenant.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2017
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The role of digital access providers 2017, para. 8
- Paragraph text
- Internet and telecommunications shutdowns involve measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information online in violation of human rights law (see A/HRC/32/13, para. 10). Governments typically conduct or order shutdowns, often with the assistance of private actors that operate networks or facilitate network traffic. Large-scale attacks on network infrastructure committed by private parties, such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, may also have shutdown effects. While shutdowns are frequently associated with total network outages, they may also arise when access to mobile communications, websites or social media and messaging applications is blocked, throttled or rendered “effectively unusable”. Shutdowns may affect towns or regions within a country, an entire country or even multiple countries and may last for periods ranging from hours to months.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2017
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
Freedom of expression, States and the private sector in the digital age 2016, para. 60
- Paragraph text
- States may also covertly tap into the technical infrastructure belonging to service providers and content platforms in order to intercept a wide variety of information, including communications, user account information, and telephone and Internet records. States reportedly tamper with computer hardware while en route to customers, infiltrate private networks and platforms with malicious software, hack into specific devices, and exploit other digital security loopholes. When business enterprises have notice of such surveillance, questions concerning their human rights responsibilities may arise, such as providing notice to customers or mitigating such harm through security measures. Companies that sell equipment and services to Governments to implement covert surveillance techniques may be implicated in human rights violations that flow from their sales.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2016
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
Freedom of expression, States and the private sector in the digital age 2016, para. 59
- Paragraph text
- The private sector supplies hardware, software and other technologies that enable States to intercept, store or analyse communications and other information. Infrastructure vendors, hardware manufacturers and software developers may design or customize products on behalf of States, or supply dual use equipment and technology that States subsequently tailor for their own needs. Internet and telecommunication service providers may also purchase equipment or software from these companies to install on their network components in order to comply with legally mandated interception protocols in the States where they operate. States may rely on these products and services to target, harass or intimidate members of vulnerable groups.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2016
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
Contemporary challenges to freedom of expression 2016, para. 16
- Paragraph text
- Third, laws often do not provide courts or other independent third-party reviews with the authority necessary to evaluate claims of violations. In the context of France's emergency legislation, for instance, a number of mandate holders raised concerns in 2016 about the lack of judicial procedure prior to the dissolution of certain organizations. Other mandate holders and I also raised concerns about the nature of the appointment of "judicial commissioners" as part of the United Kingdom's consideration of the Investigatory Powers Bill. With regard to Egypt, I noted that the power to grant and revoke permits for artistic works - along with the power to resolve appeals against such decisions - is vested exclusively in the Ministry of Culture.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2016
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The implications of States’ surveillance of communications on the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression 2013, para. 14
- Paragraph text
- As information and communication technologies evolved, so did the means by which States sought to monitor private communications. With increased use of telephones came the use of wiretapping, which consists of placing a tap on a telephone wire to listen to private phone conversations. With the replacement of analogue telephone networks with fibre optics and digital switches in the 1990s, States redesigned the networking technology to include interception capabilities ("backdoors") to permit State surveillance, rendering modern telephone networks remotely accessible and controllable.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The implications of States’ surveillance of communications on the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression 2013, para. 38
- Paragraph text
- Costs and logistical hurdles to conduct surveillance on a mass scale continue to decline rapidly, as technologies allowing for broad interception, monitoring and analysis of communications proliferate. Today, some States have the capability to track and record Internet and telephone communications on a national scale. By placing taps on the fibre-optic cables, through which the majority of digital communication information flows, and applying word, voice and speech recognition, States can achieve almost complete control of tele- and online communications. Such systems were reportedly adopted, for example, by the Egyptian and Libyan Governments in the lead-up to the Arab Spring.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The implications of States’ surveillance of communications on the exercise of the human rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and expression 2013, para. 33
- Paragraph text
- Modern surveillance technologies and arrangements that enable States to intrude into an individual's private life threaten to blur the divide between the private and the public spheres. They facilitate invasive and arbitrary monitoring of individuals, who may not be able to even know they have been subjected to such surveillance, let alone challenge it. Technological advancements mean that the State's effectiveness in conducting surveillance is no longer limited by scale or duration. Declining costs of technology and data storage have eradicated financial or practical disincentives to conducting surveillance. As such, the State now has a greater capability to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and broad-scale surveillance than ever before.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The right to access information 2013, para. 66a
- Paragraph text
- [The Special Rapporteur wishes to highlight the importance of the references made to the disclosure of information on violations of human rights and humanitarian law, stipulated in section A of principle 10 of the Tshwane Principles, namely:] There is an overriding public interest in disclosure of information regarding gross violations of human rights or serious violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes under international law, and systematic or widespread violations of the rights to personal liberty and security. Such information may not be withheld on national security grounds in any circumstances;
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Civil & Political Rights
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- All
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The right to access information 2013, para. 26
- Paragraph text
- In an attempt to address this issue, in particular since the 1980s, numerous countries have created inquiry commissions, more commonly known as truth commissions, to, in most cases, carry out investigations, make public their findings and provide recommendations regarding reparations and reconciliation. These commissions have largely reported on both the general circumstances leading to and surrounding human rights violations and individual cases. Such commissions were first established in Latin America following the collapse of military regimes and/or the end of armed conflicts that had given rise to large-scale, serious and systematic human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions, disappearances and even genocide.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- N.A.
- Year
- 2013
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
The right to freedom of opinion and expression exercised through the Internet 2011, para. 81
- Paragraph text
- When a cyber-attack can be attributed to the State, it clearly constitutes, inter alia, a violation of its obligation to respect the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Although determining the origin of cyber-attacks and the identity of the perpetrator is often technically difficult, it should be noted that States have an obligation to protect individuals against interference by third parties that undermines the enjoyment of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. This positive obligation to protect entails that States must take appropriate and effective measures to investigate actions taken by third parties, hold the persons responsible to account, and adopt measures to prevent such recurrence in the future.
- Body
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
- Document type
- Special Procedures' report
- Topic(s)
- Governance & Rule of Law
- Humanitarian
- Person(s) affected
- All
- N.A.
- Year
- 2011
- Date added
- Aug 19, 2019
Paragraph
18 shown of 18 entities