A/81/339 Power’s 13 control over the entry of all rebuilding materials, equipment and financial resources 14 had already foreclosed any real recovery or reconstruction after successive hostilities in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2021 and 2022. Since 7 October 2023, Israel has devastated the overwhelming majority of homes and civilian infrastructure. 15 Although the ceasefire agreement of October 2025 explicitly called for the immediate resumption of humanitarian aid, 16 reconstruction remains severely constrained by bans or tight controls on so-called “dual-use” items, including steel, cement and heavy equipment. 17 16. In situations of overlapping or disputed territorial authority, recovery and reconstruction priorities are shaped by multiple decision-making centres and by varying constraints imposed on humanitarian and development activities across areas. This has been observed in Yemen, where displaced persons’ capacity to influence reconstruction decisions depends on the extent to which safe and neutral channels exist to transmit their needs within each area of control. 18 17. The cessation of hostilities and the end of occupation constitute necessary conditions for reconstruction at scale. 19 Ceasefire agreements and security guarantees are critical to establishing the minimum conditions for recovery, including safe and sustained freedom of movement, restoration of livelihoods, access to essential services and access to housing, land and property. 18. Even where hostilities have largely ceased, preconditions for reconstruction may remain incomplete, and their sequencing determines whether returns hold. In some post-conflict settings, explosive ordnance contamination conditions everything that follows, obstructing the resumption of agriculture, the reopening of schools and the start of reconstruction itself. Unresolved housing, land and property claims, absent services and livelihoods, and the fate of missing persons equally determine whether return is sustainable. 19. Reconstruction need not be delayed indefinitely until full security and stability have been restored. However, where camp closures or return targets outpace these preconditions, reconstruction entrenches displacement rather than resolving it; and without parallel attention to the underlying drivers of conflict, occupation or disputed sovereignty, reconstruction rests on fragile foundations. IV. Reconstruction and internally displaced persons: key elements A. Durable solutions 20. A durable solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance or protection needs linked to their displacement and are able __________________ 13 Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2024, paras. 93 and 94. 14 Communication ISR 25/2025. 15 World Bank, European Union and United Nations, Gaza Strip Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (2026). 16 See https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/PS_IL_251010_Implementation_ Steps_for_President_Trumps_Proposal.pdf. 17 Submission from the State of Palestine; and https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha-aidtrickles-into-gaza-amid-limited-access/. 18 Submission from Maat for Peace, Development and Human Rights Association. 19 OHCHR, Legal Commentary on the Draft Guiding Principles for Reconstruction in Conflict Affected Countries and Territories, I (a). 6/24 26-12053