CAT/C/GC/4 7. Most of the communications received by the Committee refer to alleged violations by States parties of article 3 of the Convention. The present general comment provides guidance to States parties and the complainants and their representatives on the scope of article 3 and on how the Committee assesses the admissibility and the merits of the individual communications submitted to the Committee for its consideration. 8. The Committee recalls that the prohibition of torture, as defined in article 1 of the Convention, is absolute. Article 2 (2) of the Convention provides that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture”. The Committee further recalls that other acts of ill-treatment are equally prohibited and that the prohibition of ill-treatment is likewise non-derogable.2 9. The principle of “non-refoulement” of persons to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture is similarly absolute.3 10. Each State party must apply the principle of non-refoulement in any territory under its jurisdiction or any area under its control or authority, or on board a ship or aircraft registered in the State party, to any person, including persons requesting or in need of international protection, without any form of discrimination and regardless of the nationality or statelessness or the legal, administrative or judicial status of the person concerned under ordinary or emergency law. As the Committee noted in paragraph 7 of its general comment No. 2, the concept of “any territory under its jurisdiction” includes any territory or facilities and must be applied to protect any person, citizen or non-citizen without discrimination subject to the de jure or de facto control of a State party.4 11. The non-refoulement obligation in article 3 of the Convention exists whenever there are “substantial grounds”5 for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which the person is facing deportation, either as an individual or as a member of a group that may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee’s practice has been to determine that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.6 12. Any person found to be at risk of torture if deported to a given State should be allowed to remain in the territory under the jurisdiction, control or authority of the State party concerned so long as the risk persists. 7 The person in question should not be detained without proper legal justification and safeguards. Detention should always be an exceptional measure based on an individual assessment 8 and subject to regular review. 9 Furthermore, the person at risk should never be deported to another State from which the person may subsequently face deportation to a third State in which there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 See general comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 2, paras. 3, 6, 19 and 25. See Tapia Páez v. Sweden (CAT/C/18/D/39/1996), para. 14.5; Núñez Chipana v. Venezuela (CAT/C/21/D/110/1998), para. 5.6; Agiza v. Sweden (CAT/C/34/D/233/2003), para. 13.8; Singh Sogi v. Canada (CAT/C/39/D/297/2006), para. 10.2; Abdussamatov and others v. Kazakhstan (CAT/C/48/D/444/2010), para. 13.7; and Nasirov v. Kazakhstan (CAT/C/52/D/475/2011), para. 11.6. See also general comment No. 2 (2007), para. 16. See, for example, Tapia Páez v. Sweden, para. 14.5. See, for example, Dadar v. Canada (CAT/C/35/D/258/2004), para. 8.4; T.A. v. Sweden (CAT/C/34/D/226/2003), para. 7.2; N.S. v. Switzerland (CAT/C/44/D/356/2008), para. 7.3; and Subakaran R. Thirugnanasampanthar v. Australia (CAT/C/61/D/614/2014), para. 8.3. See, for example, Aemei v. Switzerland (CAT/C/18/D/34/1995), para. 11. See, for example, concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Turkey (CAT/C/TUR/CO/4), para. 26. See, for example, concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (CAT/C/GBR/CO/5), para. 30; and concluding observations on the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of Sweden (CAT/C/SWE/CO/6-7), para. 10. See, for example, general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3, para. 2; Avedes Hamayak Korban v. Sweden (CAT/C/21/D/88/1997), para. 7; and Z.T. v. Australia